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ABSTRACT
Our everyday lives are expanding fast with the introduction of new
Smart Home Systems (SHSs). Today, a myriad of SHS devices and
applications are widely available to users and have already started
to re-define our modern lives. Smart home users utilize the apps to
control and automate such devices. Users can develop their own
apps or easily download and install them from vendor-specific app
markets. App-based SHSs offer many tangible benefits to our lives,
but also unfold diverse security risks. Several attacks have already
been reported for SHSs. However, current security solutions con-
sider smart home devices and apps individually to detect malicious
actions rather than the context of the SHS as a whole. The existing
mechanisms cannot capture user activities and sensor-device-user
interactions in a holistic fashion. To address these issues, in this pa-
per, we introduce Aegis, a novel context-aware security framework
to detect malicious behavior in a SHS. Specifically, Aegis observes
the states of the connected smart home entities (sensors and de-
vices) for different user activities and usage patterns in a SHS and
builds a contextual model to differentiate between malicious and
benign behavior. We evaluated the efficacy and performance of
Aegis in multiple smart home settings (i.e., single bedroom, dou-
ble bedroom, duplex) with real-life users performing day-to-day
activities and real SHS devices. We also measured the performance
of Aegis against five different malicious behaviors. Our detailed
evaluation shows that Aegis can detect malicious behavior in SHS
with high accuracy (over 95%) and secure the SHS regardless of
the smart home layout, device configuration, installed apps, and
enforced user policies. Finally, Aegis achieves minimum overhead
in detecting malicious behavior in SHS, ensuring easy deployability
in real-life smart environments.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Distributed systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The capabilities of the smart home devices have evolved from
merely controlling lights and opening garage doors to connecting
our living spaces to the cyber world [9, 20, 33]. Such functionality
provides more autonomous, efficient, and convenient daily oper-
ations [12]. For instance, sensor-activated lights offer energy effi-
ciency while smart locks andmotion-activated cameras offer a more
secure home environment. Compared to early Smart Home Systems
(SHS) with fixed device setup procedures and limited functionalities,
modern SHSs have adopted a more user-centric, app-based model.
Similar to the smartphone ecosystem, SHS’s users can download
apps from the vendor’s app market and easily set up and control
the smart devices, which makes SHSs more popular and versatile
than ever [32].
The integration of programming platforms with smart home
devices surely enhances the functionalities of SHSs, but it also
exposes the vulnerabilities of the devices to the attackers. Attack-
ers can release malicious apps in third-party markets and public
repositories (e.g., GitHub) easily. Then, careless users can down-
load and utilize them for their devices. From here, the attackers
can exploit smart home devices in several ways: they can perform
denial-of-service attacks to obstruct normal operations of SHS [34],
they can compromise one device in SHS and get access to other
connected devices [11], they can even leak personal information
such as unlock code of a smart lock and gain physical access to the
home [6, 18]. Recently, a repository of malicious apps in different
smart home platforms has been published exhibiting several vulner-
abilities of the current smart home app development ecosystem [38].
Nonetheless, a security solution that detects these emerging threats
associated with SHSs does not exist and is direly needed.
Recent studies have proposed the implementation of enhanced
permission models for SHSs, which depends on specific user per-
mission [18] or the analysis the source code of the apps to detect
vulnerabilities, which is only effective against specific types of at-
tacks [6]. Moreover, existing solutions focus on the detection of
malicious activities that affect smart home devices and apps individ-
ually. However, a more holistic approach that also considers user
activity contexts and sensor-device-user interactions (e.g., move-
ment directions, sensors activated, rooms involved) is needed. For
example, if a user walks from the bedroom to the hallway, s/he
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may activates multiple devices and sensors along his/her path (i.e.,
walking context) in a specific sequence: moving towards the bed-
room door, opening the door, entering the hallway, closing the door,
and reaching the hallway. A user cannot simply skip any of these
steps and reach the hallway directly from the bedroom. Again, de-
vice actions in a SHS are correlated with each other which can be
observed from a context-aware model. For example, a smart light
triggered by the motion sensor can be verified by checking the
user’s presence in the home using a presence sensor. A contextual
awareness of devices and applications that considers these types of
sensor-device-user interactions can provide valuable information
about malicious activities occurring in the SHSs, something that is
missing in current smart home solutions.
To address these emerging threats and shortcomings of SHSs, we
present Aegis, a novel context-aware security framework to detect
malicious behavior in a SHS. Aegis observes the changing patterns
of the conditions (active/inactive) of smart home entities (sensors
and devices) for different user activities and builds a contextual
model to detect malicious activities. Here, context-awareness refers
to the ability of Aegis to understand the changes in sensors and
devices’ states due to ongoing user activities and determine if the
behavior in the SHS is benign or not. Smart home devices are typ-
ically configured with different sensors to provide autonomous
control and uninterrupted operations. Thus, different sensors in
a SHS can sense user activities (motion, opening doors, etc.) and
trigger associated devices to perform pre-defined tasks. Aegis cor-
relates this sensor-device relation with different user activities and
builds a context-aware model to define benign user behavior. Aegis
also uses app context to understand the trigger-action scenarios be-
tween smart home entities (sensors and devices) and automatically
upgrades the framework if new devices are added to the SHS. As
a security framework, Aegis observes the current states (active or
inactive) of smart home sensors and devices and checks with the
learned user behavior to detect any malicious behavior. Specifically,
Aegis utilizes a Markov Chain-based machine learning technique to
detect malicious behavior. Additionally, Aegis uses an action man-
agement system to alert the users in the event of malicious behavior
and considers user responses to improve the context-aware model
for better accuracy (adaptive training mode). We tested Aegis in real
SHSs scenarios where 15 different users performed typical daily
activities in three different home layouts generating over 55000
sensor-device correlated events. Furthermore, we considered differ-
ent device settings (sensor-device relations), apps, and user policies
to evaluate the performance of Aegis against five different threats.
Our extensive evaluation demonstrates that Aegis can detect differ-
ent threats to SHS with high accuracy and F-score (over 95%). In
addition, Aegis achieves minimum overhead in terms of latency and
resource usage making Aegis compatible for real-life deployment.
Contributions: Our main contributions are noted as follows:
• Aegis. We present a novel context-aware security framework
to detect malicious activity in SHS. We capture sensor-device co-
dependence in smart home to understand the context of the user ac-
tivity and detect malicious behavior. Additionally, we implemented
an action management system to alert users about Aegis’s findings.
• User-specific configurations. We designed Aegis to support
different smart home layouts and configurations. Aegis allows easy
Figure 1: A smart home environment and its major compo-
nents.
integration of new devices and apps creating app contexts and
reconfiguring the training data automatically. We also introduced
an adaptive training model to improve the detection mechanism
from user responses automatically.
• High accuracy and minimal overhead. Through a detailed
evaluation, we demonstrated how Aegis can detect different mali-
cious activities in a SHS. Our results show that Aegis can achieve
high accuracy and F-score and impose minimum overhead in the
system.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we present the background information. Then, we discuss
the adversary model in Section 3. Section 4 details Aegis’s archi-
tecture and Section 5 evaluates the efficacy of Aegis in detecting
different malicious behavior in SHS. In Section 6 and Section 7, we
discuss how different types of users will be benefited by deploying
Aegis in real-life SHS and the related work, respectively. Finally,
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the components of the SHS that we
assume for Aegis. We also detail different features used in Aegis to
detect different malicious activities in SHS. In Figure 1, a typical
architecture of a SHS is shown. A SHS has four basic building
blocks as shown in Figure 1. The first block of the SHS comprises
sensors and devices in the system. These smart home devices and
sensors are connected to each other via a smart hub. As there is
no generic interoperability standard among smart home devices,
the hub provides a common access point for all the entities in
the SHS. The hub is connected to both cloud backend service and
smartphone/tablet companion app. Users can use the smartphone
app to control the smart home entities or install different apps
from the app stores. Indeed, we can group SHS architectures in
two main categories: a cloud-based architecture where the installed
apps run in the cloud backend (e.g., SmartThings), and hub-based
architecture where the installed apps run the hub locally (e.g., Apple
HomeKit).
2.1 New Design Features Considered by Aegis
Context-awareness. Context-awareness refers to the ability of a
system to use situational and environmental information about the
user, location, and devices to adapt its operation accordingly [18,
27, 29]. In a SHS, all the sensors and devices follow different trigger-
action scenarios to perform tasks. Here, sensors are used to provide
input in the devices (trigger) and devices take autonomous decisions
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Figure 2: Context-awareness feature, which is not consid-
ered in existing SHS.
(actions) based on these inputs. When a user performs a task in a
SHS, several smart home sensors and devices may become active
in a sequential pattern. The pattern of active devices and sensors
is different but specific for distinct user activities. Existing SHS
cannot observe these patterns in sensors’ and devices’ states over
time and can not understand the context of the user activity. For
example, while a user moves from one bedroom to a hallway, several
devices and sensors become active in a sequential manner (Figure 2):
moving towards bedroom door (sub-context 1: BL1, BLi1, BM1 are
active), bedroom door opens (sub-context 2: BL1, BLi1, BM1, BD1
are active), entering the hallway (sub-context 3: BL1, BLi1, BD1,
HLi2, HL2, HM2 are active), bedroom door and light close and
reaches the hallway (sub-context 4: HLi2, HL2, HM2 are active). To
complete the activity (moving from the bedroom to the hallway),
the user must follow the sub-contexts in the same sequential pattern.
The user cannot skip one specific sub-context and move to the next
one to complete the activity. For instance, the transition from sub-
context 1 to sub-context 4 is not possible as a user cannot go to the
hallway from the bedroom without opening the door. Motivated
by this, Aegis is designed to understand this property of SHS to
build a context-aware model for different user activities and usage
patterns and differentiates between benign and malicious activities
of smart home devices and sensors.
Sensor-device co-dependence In a SHS, sensors, and devices can
be configured as independent entities. However, they work in a
co-dependent manner to provide autonomous functionalities. For
instance, smart lights can be configured with motion sensors to
light up when motion is sensed. Here, the smart light depends on
the input from the motion sensor while the motion sensor alone
cannot provide any significant function in a SHS. The functions of
devices and sensors create a co-dependent relationship with each
other. In this way, sensors and devices in the SHS can build many-to-
many co-dependent relationships. However, existing SHSs do not
consider this co-dependent relationship and can not visualize the
context of a user activity by observing the usage pattern of smart
home entities. In short, sensors and devices in a SHS are configured
as independent components, but in reality, they are function-wise
co-dependent. Aegis considers these relations to build the context
of the user activities in a SHS.
User activity-device correlation. In a SHS, different users utilize
and control smart home devices in multiple ways. For instance, a
user can set a security camera to take pictures whenever a motion is
detected in the associated motion sensors. On the other hand, users
control devices in multiple ways. For example, a user can unlock a
door by using the smartphone app or entering the code manually.
Here, the state of the lock can be determined by user activity on
the smartphone or by using a presence sensor to detect the user
near the smart lock. In short, by observing the user activities in a
SHS, it is possible to determine the normal operation of smart home
devices. One can define normal or malicious user behavior with
the user activity-device correlation. Current SHS cannot correlate
user activity and device actions correctly, which is considered as a
feature in Aegis to differentiate benign and malicious activities.
3 PROBLEM SCOPE AND THREAT MODEL
We introduce the problem scope and articulate the threat model.
3.1 Problem Scope
We assume a fully automated SHS with several smart home devices
and sensors. Here, the following sensor-device triggering rules are
configured - the smart lights are configured with motion sensors,
the smart smoke detector is configured with smoke sensor. The SHS
allows manual device control by the users (e.g., unlocking smart
lock with PIN). We also assume that the user utilizes customized
third-party apps to control the devices. Furthermore, the SHS has
more than one user authorized to control the devices in the system.
We assume the following incidents happening throughout the day
in the SHS - (1) one user is walking inside the home but the lights
are not triggered by the motion sensors, (2) one user is trying to
unlock the smart lock using PIN code, (3) a fire alarm is being
triggered in the system, (4) a smart light inside the house executes
a blinking pattern.
We propose Aegis as a novel security framework that builds a
context-aware model based on user activities to determine benign
and malicious incidents in the SHS. Aegis answers several questions
that may arise from the above-mentioned incidents - (1) What is
the reason for no activity in the smart light?, (2) Is an attacker is
trying to unlock the door using PIN code?, (3) Is the fire alarm being
triggered by a malicious app?, (4) What caused the smart light to
blink and what is the intent of this activity? Aegis differentiates
between normal and malicious activities happening in a SHS. Fur-
thermore, Aegis detects malicious activities occurring in a device
by observing the ongoing activities of all the connected devices in
the SHS.
3.2 Threat Model
Aegis considers anomalous user behaviors (e.g., unauthorized users
changing the device states) that may disrupt the normal functional-
ity of the SHS. Also, device vulnerabilities that may cause device
malfunction or open doors to threats like impersonation attacks and
false data injection attacks are considered by Aegis. Additionally,
this work assumes carelessly-designed and malicious smart home
applications that may cause unauthorized or malicious activities in
the SHS. These malicious activities may facilitate side channel and
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. In Appendix D, we present specific
examples of attack scenarios that are used later to evaluate the
effectiveness of Aegis (Section 5).
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Figure 3: The architecture of Aegis.
Threat Attack Method Attack Example
Threat-1 Impersonationattack
An unauthorized user steals the unlock
code of a smart lock and try to unlock the
door.
Threat-2 False datainjection
A malicious smart home app can exist in
the SHS and inject forged data to perform
malicious activities.
Threat-3 Side channelattack
A malicious smart home app can exist in
the SHS and perform legitimate, yet vul-
nerable side-channel activities (switch-
ing on when no one is around in vacation
mode) which can be harnessed by other
apps (consideredmalicious) in the system
or the attacker himself.
Threat-4 Denial-of-service
A malicious smart home app installed in
the SHS and impede normal behavior of
the smart home devices.
Threat-5 Triggering a maliciousapp
A malicious smart home app can exist in
the system which can be triggered by a
specific activity pattern or device action
(e.g., switching a smart light in a specific
on/off pattern) in a smart home environ-
ment.
Table 1: Summary of the threat model considered for Aegis.
The information leakage caused by a compromised device or
untrusted communication channel in the SHS are considered out
of scope of Aegis. We also assume that the data collected from the
devices and central management system (e.g., Hub, cloud, etc.) is
not compromised. In Table 1, we summarize the threat model used
later in Aegis’s performance evaluation (Section 5).
4 AEGIS FRAMEWORK
Aegis has four main modules: (1) data collector, (2) context genera-
tor, (3) data analysis, and (4) action management (Figure 3). First,
Aegis collects data from smart home entities (sensors and devices)
for day-to-day user activities. The data collector module uses an
app to collect all the device states (active/inactive) from the hub.
Additionally, this module collects rules generated by different smart
apps using the app rule extractor.
The device state data is used to understand the context of the
user activities and feeds the context generation module. This mod-
ule creates context arrays depending on usage patterns and the
predetermined user policies in the smart apps. Each context array
contains overall information of the user activities and device states
in the SHS.
The context arrays generated in the context generation module
are used by the anomaly detector module to implement machine
learning-based analysis and build the context-aware model of the
SHS. Additionally, anomaly detector module decides whether or not
malicious activities occur in the SHS.
Finally, the malicious activities detected by the anomaly detector
module are forwarded to the action management module. This mod-
ule notifies the users regarding the unauthorized activities. Also, it
offers adaptive training mode where users can validate any false
positive or false negative occurrence and re-train the detection
model to improve the performance of Aegis.
4.1 Data Collector Module
The data collector module has two sub-modules: device data collec-
tor and app data collector.
4.1.1 Device Data Collector. Aegis collects data from smart home
devices and sensors using the data collector module. In a SHS, there
can be multiple devices and sensors connected through a hub and
operating in a co-dependent manner. Data collector of Aegis collects
the state of these devices (active or inactive) autonomously and
forwards these data to the context generation module. Based on
the type of data, the collected data is governed by:
Data array, E = {S,D,M}, (1)
where S is the set of features extracted from the sensors, D is the
set of features extracted from the devices, and M is the features
extracted from the associated controller devices (e.g., smartphone,
smart tablet) in a SHS. We describe the characteristics of these
features below.
• Features extracted from sensors (S): An SHS can comprise several
sensors such as motion and light sensors. They sense changes in the
vicinity of the devices and work as input to multiple devices. Sensor
data can be both logical states (e.g., motion sensor) and numerical
values (light sensor). For Aegis, we consider both logical states and
numerical values of sensors to create the context of user activities.
• Features extracted from devices (D): In a SHS, several devices
can be connected with each other and also with different sensors.
These devices remain active based on user activities in a smart
home environment. Aegis observes the daily activities of users and
collects the device state data (active/inactive state) to build the
context of the associated activity.
• Features extracted from controller devices (M): In a SHS, Smart-
phone or tablet works as a control device to the SHS and users
can control any device using the associated smart app of the smart
home. Aegis considers any control command given from the con-
troller device as a feature to understand the context of user activity.
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Additionally, the location of the connected controller device can
also work as an input to control multiple devices. For example, a
thermostat can be configured to the desired temperature whenever
the smartphone of the user is connected to the smart home network.
Aegis considers the location of the controller device as a feature to
build the context of user activities.
As user activities on a SHS can vary based on the number of
users, Aegis considers multi-user settings to understand the user
activity contexts correctly. Moreover, user activities also change
based on the daily routine of users. For this, in the data collection
process, Aegis also offers time-based activity settings (weekday and
weekend settings).
4.1.2 App Rule Extractor. Modern SHSs offer an app-centric model
where users can install different apps to automate the functions
of smart home devices. These apps mostly define a trigger-action
scenario for specific devices. For instance, an app can automate a
smart light by configuring it with a motion sensor or light sensor.
Here, the sensors work as a trigger and the state of the smart light
(on/off) refers to the action. These trigger-action scenarios can
represent the app context which can be used to validate the user
activity context in a SHS. Additionally, the app context is also used
to train the analytical model for new devices in SHS. Aegis uses a
static analysis tool, logic extractor, to extract the app logic which is
used to determine the app context in a SHS. Logic extractor takes
the source code of an app as the input and extracts the trigger-
action scenarios enforced in the app as the output. For example, if
a smart light is configured with a contact sensor, Aegis extracts the
following logic from the app (sample app is given in Appendix B.
Listing 1: trigger-action Scenario of a sample app
1 Trigger: Contact1
2 Action: Switch1
3 Logic 1: contact1 = on, light1 = on
4 Logic 2: contact1 = off, light1 = off
4.2 Context Generation Module
The data collector module forwards the collected data to the context
generation module to build the context of different user activities.
Then, the context generation module maps and aggregates the data
to build context arrays. Each context array consists of information
on the usage patterns in the SHS for different activities, which can
be used for further analysis and to determine malicious activities in
the system. The context array modeling process has the following
steps:
• Context of sensors: Sensor features collected in the data collector
consists of both logic state (on/off) and numerical values. Aegis ob-
serves the sensor data and generates the conditions of the sensors.
These conditions represent the changing pattern of the sensor. If the
current sensor value is different than the previous one, Aegis con-
siders this as an active condition that is represented as 1. Similarly,
conditions labeled as inactive are represented as 0.
• Context of devices: Data collector of Aegis collects device state
(active/inactive) data for every connected device. These device state
data are converted to logical states (1 represents active and 0 repre-
sents inactive) to build the context of user activities in a SHS.
• Context of controller devices: There are two features of the con-
troller device (e.g., smartphone, tablet, etc.) that are collected by
Aegis: Control command for the devices and the location of the
controller device. For any command from the smartphone/tablet,
Aegis considers the active condition of smartphone/tablet which is
represented as 1 in context array or 0 otherwise. An SHS allows two
different states to represent the location of the controller device -
home and away. Home location indicates that the controller device
is connected to the home network and away represents otherwise.
Aegis represents the "home" location of the smartphone as 1 and
the "away" location as 0 in the context array.
The final context array can be represented as follows:
Context Array, C = [{S1, S2, ..., SX }, {D1, D2, ..., DY }, {M1, M2 }], (2)
where S1, S2, ..., SX captures the conditions of X number of sensors
in the SHS, D1,D2, ...,DY the conditions of Y number of sensors
in the SHS, andM1,M2 the conditions of smartphone/tablet in the
SHS.
Context generation module also generates the app’s context. As
most of the app’s logic represents a trigger-action scenario, the
context generation module converts the logic in a binary represen-
tation. For example, the logic extracted from the app presented in
Listing 1 is given below:
Listing 2: Generated app context of a sample app
1 App Context 1: contact1 = 1 , Light1 = 1
2 App context 2: contact1 = 0, Light1 = 0
Here, for the contact sensor, 1 and 0 represent the contact state
from "open" or "close" respectively. Similarly, for the smart light, 1
and 0 represent the light state from "on" or "off", respectively. These
app contexts are used to validate the sensor-device co-dependence
captured in the context array. Additionally, these app contexts are
used to update the training dataset whenever a new device is added
to the SHS.
4.3 Anomaly Detector Module
In the third module, Aegis takes context arrays generated in the
context generation module as input and trains a Markov Chain-
based machine learning model which is used to detect malicious
activities in SHS.
The Markov Chain model is based on two main assumptions: (1)
the probability of occurring a state at time t +1 only depends on the
state at time t only and (2) the transition between two consecutive
states is independent of time.Aegis uses this Markov Chainmodel to
illustrate a series of events in a SHS. Here, a series of events denotes
user activity and usage pattern and the state represents the context
array at a specific time t generated in the context generationmodule.
The probabilistic condition of Markov Chain model is shown in
Equation 3, where Xt denotes the state at time t for a user activity
in the SHS [19].
P (Xt+1 = x |X1 = x1, X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) = P (Xt+1 = x |Xt = xt ),
when, P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) > 0 (3)
Aegis considers the context array given in Equation 2 as an array of
variables and observes its changes over time. For every user activity
on a SHS, several context arrays are created. These arrays follow
a different but specific pattern for different user activities. Each
element of the context array represents the condition of a smart
home entity (active/inactive states of sensor, device, or smartphone).
For a distinct time, t , we consider the combination of all the smart
home devices’ and sensors’ condition as binary output (1 for the
active state of an entity and 0 for the inactive state). Thus, the
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Figure 4: Markov Chain model for Aegis.
number of total states (A) will be the exponent of 2 and can be
represented as a n-bit binary number, where n is the total number of
entities in the SHS. Let assume Pi j denotes the transition probability
of the system from state i at time t to state j at time t + 1. If the
SHS has n number of entities andm = 2n states in the system, the
transition matrix of the Markov Chain model can be illustrated by
Figure 4. Here, each transition probability from one state to another
state represents an element of the transition matrix.
If the SHS hasX0,X1, . . . ,XT states at a given time t = 0, 1, . . . ,T ,
the elements of the transition matrix can be shown as Pi j =
Ni j
Ni
where Ni j denotes the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1, Xt is
the state at time t , and Xt+1 is the state at time t + 1 [37]. Instead
of predicting the next state using the Markov Chain model, Aegis
determines the probability of transition between two states in the
SHS at a given time. We train the Markov Chain model with the
generated context arrays from the context generation module and
construct the transition matrix. Using this transition matrix, Aegis
determines the probability of transition from one state (i.e., context
array) to another state over time. For example, in Figure 2, the tran-
sition between sub-context 1 and sub-context 2 is valid as the user
can perform this activity. However, the transition from sub-context
1 to sub-context 4 is invalid as the user cannot go from the bedroom
to the hallway without going through sub-context 2 and 3. Thus,
Aegis defines benign or malicious device behavior based on user
activities.
4.4 Action Management Module
Finally, the action management module notifies the users in the
event of malicious activity in the SHS. Action management module
has two operation modes - detection mode and adaptive training
mode.
• Detection mode: In the detection mode, Aegis pushes a notification
in the controller device (smartphone, smart tablet) to notify the
users if malicious activity is detected. Aegis provides the device ID
and the installed app names to the user for further action.
• Adaptive training mode: As Aegis builds a contextual model from
user activities, it is important to verify the correct context of an
ongoing user activity [24]. In a SHS, users can perform different
activities in an irregular pattern. For example, a guest may come to
the house which will introduce some new activity patterns in the
SHS. These abrupt data patterns may cause a higher false positive
rate in the contextual model. To address this issue, Aegis offers the
adaptive training mode, a user feedback process to improve the
performance. In the adaptive training mode, whenever a malicious
activity is detected, Aegis sends a notification to the controller de-
vice (smartphone, smart tablet, etc.) for user confirmation. Users
can either confirm the malicious activity from the controller device
or mark the activity as benign. If the user confirms the activity as
benign, Aegis label that activity context and train the framework
automatically. Hence, Aegis can correctly and automatically im-
prove the training dataset by adding irregular or new user activity
pattern.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the evaluation of Aegis, we consider several research questions:
RQ1 What is the performance of Aegis in different smart home
layouts and devices? (Sec 5.2)
RQ2 What is the impact of different apps, policies, and configura-
tions on the performance of Aegis? (Sec. 5.3)
RQ3 What is the impact of different user behavior on the perfor-
mance of Aegis? (Sec. 5.4)
RQ4 What are the performance overhead introduced by Aegis in a
SHS? (Sec. 5.5)
5.1 Evaluation Setup and Methodology
We obtained appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
to collect daily usage data of a SHS with multiple users. We imple-
mented a test setting where the users had the freedom to design
their own smart home environment and perform regular daily ac-
tivities in a timely order. While collecting the user activity data, we
considered five features to enrich our dataset: Anonymous User ID,
User Role, Smart Home Layout, Activity Day-time, and User Policy.
For each user, we assigned an anonymous ID to ensure privacy. We
also assigned a specific user role to each participant to understand
the context of the user activities in a multi-user scenario. As there
exist different home layouts in real scenarios, we considered three
different home layouts (single bedroom apartment, two-bedroom
home, and duplex home) and let the users choose their layout and
smart home devices. Moreover, user activities in a SHS depend
on the user’s daily routine which may change for different days
of the week. We considered this and collected the user activities
performed in both weekdays and weekends, separately. Finally, as
current smart home platforms let users define multiple policies to
control devices, we allowed the users to define their own policies
in the SHS during the data collection process.
We chose Samsung SmartThings platform to create the smart
home environment because of its large app market and compatibil-
ity with other smart devices [15]. We considered the most common
devices in our SHS. A detailed list of devices that were used in our
experiments is given in Appendix C. We collected data from 15
different individuals with different user roles, user policies, and
smart home layouts. Our dataset consisted of over 55000 events
collected in a 10-day period. We implemented a custom app as part
of Aegis’s data acquisition module that uses the ListEvent command
from SmartThings API to collect the device logs. For collecting
app context data from installed apps, we used a static analysis tool
available online [6]. We created an app context database which
consists of 150 official Samsung SmartThings apps. Whenever users
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Normal Training Adaptive Training
Smart Home Layout Recall FN TN FP Accuracy F-score Recall FN TN FP Accuracy F-score
Single Bedroom Home 0.95 0.05 1 0 0.9547 0.9604 0.97 0.03 1 0 0.9712 0.9847
Double Bedroom Home 0.93 0.07 1 0 0.9340 0.9655 0.96 0.04 1 0 0.964 0.9795
Duplex Home 0.91 0.09 1 0 0.9119 0.9529 0.96 0.04 1 0 0.9614 0.9688
Table 2: Performance evaluation of Aegis in different smart home layouts.
Normal Training Adaptive Training
Smart Home Layout
No of
Controllers Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy F-score
Single Bedroom
Home
2 0.9472 0.0528 1 0 0.9477 0.9729 0.9685 0.0315 1 0 0.9711 0.9839
3 0.9399 0.0601 1 0 0.9405 0.9690 0.9564 0.0436 1 0 0.96 0.9777
4 0.9041 0.0959 0.96 0.04 0.9352 0.9312 0.9482 0.0588 1 0 0.9525 0.9734
Double Bedroom
Home
2 0.9222 0.0778 1 0 0.9229 0.9595 0.9654 0.0346 1 0 0.9682 0.9823
3 0.9058 0.0942 0.9529 0.0471 0.9062 0.9288 0.9523 0.0477 0.9785 0.0215 0.9545 0.9652
4 0.8806 0.1194 0.8941 0.1059 0.8807 0.8873 0.9476 0.0524 0.96 0.04 0.9486 0.9537
Duplex Home
2 0.9017 0.0983 1 0 0.9038 0.9483 0.958 0.042 1 0 0.9615 0.9785
3 0.8901 0.1099 0.9238 0.0762 0.8909 0.9067 0.9512 0.0488 0.975 0.025 0.9531 0.9629
4 0.8694 0.1306 0.8857 0.1143 0.8698 0.8775 0.9388 0.0612 0.953 0.047 0.94 0.9458
Table 3: Performance evaluation of Aegis in different multi-user scenarios.
install an app in SHS, Aegis searches for existing app context in
the database and adds the context into the training dataset for data
validation purpose. For any third-party app, users can manually use
the source code of the app in Aegis and generate the app context
which is later added in the database.
For collecting the malicious dataset, we created six different
attack scenarios, and their associated smart home apps based on the
adversary model presented in Section 3 (more details in Appendix
D). Additionally, we added some malfunctioning devices (e.g., a
smart lock without power, fused smart light, etc.) in the SHS to
test Aegis in cases that include device malfunction. We collected
24 different datasets (4 dataset for each attack scenario) for a total
of over 10000 events. We used 75% of the benign user data to train
the Markov Chain model. Then the remaining 25% of data along
with the malicious dataset was used in the testing phase which is a
common practice [3, 14, 28]. Finally, to evaluate Aegis, we utilized
six different performance metrics: True Positive Rate or recall rate
(TPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), True Negative Rate or precision
rate (TNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), Accuracy, and F-score. Details
of these performance metrics are given in Appendix A.
5.2 Evaluation with Different Home Layouts
To evaluate Aegis in different smart home layouts, we consider two
important criteria (1) different smart home layouts, (2) multiple
numbers of users. A SHS can have different smart home layouts
and different number of devices. We tested the efficiency of Aegis
in a multi-user environment and different smart home layouts.
Different smart home layouts: User activities in a smart home
can vary depending on the home layout as different layouts can lead
to different usage patterns. To evaluate Aegis, we considered three
different layouts: single bedroom home, double bedroom home, and
duplex home. Here, we considered a single authorized smart home
user in different layouts. We collected data from 15 different users
in these layouts. Table 2 presents the evaluation results associated
with different smart home layouts. We can observe that accuracy
and F-score for different layouts vary from 96-91% and 97-95%,
respectively. Aegis also achieves high TP (96-91%) and TN rate
(100%) irrespective of layouts. One can safely confirm that variation
in different layouts has a minimal impact on the performance of
Aegis. Table 2 also shows how the performance of Aegis improves in
adaptive training mode. Here, whenever the controller device (e.g.,
smartphone, tablet, etc.) is connected in the smart home network,
we infer the user is in home location and use adaptive trainingmode.
One can notice that the accuracy of Aegis increases from 95% to 97%
in adaptive training mode for single bedroom layout. For double
bedroom and duplex home, Aegis achieves 96.4% and 96.1% accuracy
respectively. As adaptive training mode uses user validation to
reduce FP and FN events, F-Score increases to approximately 97%
for all three layouts. In summary, Aegis can achieve accuracy and
F-score over 95% for all three smart home layouts.
Different number of authorized users: Smart home platforms
allow users to add more than one authorized user for the same SHS.
Hence, a SHS can have multi-user scenarios with different user
activities happening at the same time. To evaluate this setting of
the smart home in Aegis, we collected data from several multi-user
settings with different users performing their daily activities at
once. We used different smart home layouts with several multi-user
scenarios (two, three, and four authorized controllers/conflicting
users) in our data collection process. Additionally, we performed
the aforementioned attack scenarios to collect malicious dataset and
tested the efficiency of Aegis in different multi-user environments.
Table 3 illustrates the detailed evaluation of Aegis in different smart
home settings. For single bedroom layout, we can observe that accu-
racy and F-score reach the peak (0.9477 and 0.9729, respectively) for
the two users setup. If we increase the number of authorized users
in the SHS, the accuracy gradually decreases with an increasing
FN rate. Similarly, for double bedrooms and duplex home layout,
Aegis achieves the highest accuracy and F-score for two authorized
users’ setup. Both accuracy and F-score decreases while the FN rate
increases as the number of authorized users increases. The highest
accuracy achieved in two bedrooms and duplex home layouts are
92.29% and 90.38%, respectively. As different users interact with
smart home devices in varied ways, the FN rate increases with
the number of users in the system. To minimize the number of FN
events, we implement the adaptive training mode in Aegis. In a
multi-user scenario, a notification is pushed in all the controller
devices if Aegis detects a malicious event in adaptive training mode.
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Figure 5: Performance evaluation of Aegis with different sensors.
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Figure 6: Accuracy of Aegis with different number of sensors (a), (b), (c) and with different number of benign and malicious
apps (d), (e).
All the authorized users can confirm the event based on their ac-
tivities and Aegis trains the analytical model with validated data.
One can notice from Table 3 that Aegis achieves the highest accu-
racy and F-Score (97% and 98%, respectively) for two users setup in
single bedroom layout. Adaptive training mode also decreases FN
rate approximately by 38.6% and increases the accuracy to 96% and
95.25% for three and four authorized user scenarios respectively. For
two bedroom and duplex home layout, adaptive training mode also
increases the efficiency of Aegis. Adaptive training mode reduces
FN and FP rate approximately by 60% while accuracy and F-Score
increases to approximately 96% and 98% respectively in a double
bedroom and duplex home layout. In summary, Aegis can minimize
the effect of conflicting user activities in a multi-user scenario in
adaptive training mode while increasing efficiency.
5.3 Evaluation with Different Smart Home
Configurations
In this sub-section, we evaluate Aegis based on different smart
home configurations including (1) different sensor configurations,
(2) different user policies, and (3) number of installed apps.
Different sensor configurations: To evaluate the efficiency of
Aegis based on deployed sensors, we use several combinations of
sensors to build the context-aware model of user activities and
report accuracy in Figure 5. Since Aegis considers different smart
home sensors and devices as co-dependent components, we try to
understand to what extent changing the combinations of sensors
in a SHS affects Aegis’s performance. For this, we tested the effi-
cacy of Aegis with four different combinations of sensors: without
motion sensor, without the door sensor, without the temperature
sensor, and without the light sensor. As seen in Figure 5c and 5d,
decreasing the number of sensors from the context-aware model
in Aegis declines the accuracy and F-score of the framework. Re-
moving the motion sensor resulted in the lowest accuracy and
F-score (61% and 68% in duplex home layout, respectively). As mo-
tion sensors are configured with the majority of the devices (smart
light, smart lock, etc.) and used in most of the user activity con-
text, it affects the performance of Aegis significantly. We can also
observe that removing sensors from the SHS introduces high FN
rate as our proposed framework cannot build the context of the
user activities correctly (Figure 5b). Again, Figure 5c illustrates that
removing the temperature sensor from the SHS does not influence
the performance significantly (85-91% accuracy and 88-91% F-score
in different layouts). The main reason is that the temperature sen-
sor can be configured with a limited number of devices; hence, it
is affected by user activities less than other sensors. Without the
door sensor and light sensor, Aegis can achieve moderate accuracy
ranges from 77%-86% and 79%-88%, respectively. Figure 6 illustrates
the change in accuracy of Aegis for changing the number of sensors
in different smart home layouts. For all three smart home layouts
(single bedroom, double bedroom, and duplex home), limiting the
number of sensors in the system decreases the accuracy of Aegis.
In conclusion, limiting the number of sensors in a SHS can reduce
the efficiency of Aegis by introducing FN cases in the system.
Evaluation Based on Installed Apps: Smart home users can in-
stall multiple smart apps to configure and control the same devices
or different devices at the same time. For example, users can install
two different apps to control a smart light at a time with motion
and door sensor respectively. To test the effectiveness of Aegis
based on the installed apps, we installed 12 benign apps in total
in the system to build the context-aware model of user activities.
Figure 6d shows the accuracy of Aegis in detecting malicious apps
in a SHS based on installed apps. Here, we installed different mali-
cious apps (Section 3) in the system with multiple benign apps to
determine the effectiveness of Aegis. From 6d, one can notice that
Aegis achieves the highest accuracy of 98.15% for Threat-2 and the
lowest accuracy of 94.34% for Threat-3 for only one benign smart
app installed in the system. With the increment of benign apps in
the SHS (highest 12 benign apps), accuracy ranges between 98%
to 95% and 94% to 92.5% for Threat-2 and Threat-3, respectively.
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Figure 7: Performance evaluation of Aegis in a policy-enforced SHS (a), (b) and performance of Aegis in terms of user feedback
(c), (d), (e).
The accuracy of Aegis in detecting Threat-1, Threat-2, and Threat-5
varies between 96% to 93%. We also tested different malicious apps
installed at once in the SHS with a fixed number of benign apps (12
benign apps) to understand the effectiveness of Aegis completely.
Figure 6e depicts the accuracy of Aegis based on the number of
malicious apps installed on the system. One can notice that Aegis
can achieve an accuracy of 98% for one malicious app installed
in the SHS which decreases very little with the higher number of
malicious apps (92.57% with five malicious apps). In conclusion, the
performance of Aegis changed very little with the change in the
number of benign apps and malicious apps installed in the SHS.
Evaluation Based on User Policies: In modern SHS, users can
define customized policies to control the smart home devices. For
example, users can impose a time window to activate a smart light
in a SHS. In this sub-section, we test the efficiency of Aegis with
different policies enforced in SHS. We consider the following user
policies to evaluate Aegis:
User Policy 1: Users can apply time-specific operations for different
smart home entities. In policy 1, users configure a smart light with
the motion sensor which will be enforced only from sunset to
sunrise.
User Policy 2:Users can apply sensor-specific operations for different
smart home devices. In policy 2, users configure smart lights with
light, motion, and door sensors.
Figures 7a and 7b present the performance of Aegis in these
policies enforced in SHSs. One can observe that Aegis achieved
accuracy as high as 95% while enforcing time-specific operations
in SHS (Figure 7a). The F-score also ranges from 89% to 94% for
different smart home layouts with time-specific operations with low
FN rate (5%-8%). For User Policy 2, one can observe a slight fall in
the accuracy and F-score as changing sensor-device configuration
introduces FN cases in the system. From Figure 7a, we can see that
Aegis can perform with an accuracy ranging from 85% to 93% for
different smart home layouts while changing the sensor-device
configurations. Aegis also achieves F-score ranging from 86.5-92%
for different configurations. In summary, Aegis can detect malicious
activities in policy-enforced SHS with high accuracy and F-score.
5.4 Evaluation with Different User Behavior
In this sub-section, we test Aegis in terms of user interactions and
behavior in the SHS. Aegis uses an adaptive training method which
requires users’ feedback to detect FP and FN cases. This adaptive
training method may cause user fatigue with excessive feedback
notifications [2]. To determine how the user fatigue may affect the
performance of Aegis, we performed accuracy vs. user feedback
study which is shown in Figure 7c and 7d. Figure 7c shows the
number of notifications generated in adaptive training mode by
Aegis in different smart home settings over a 10 day period. One can
notice that in all three layouts the number of generated notification
decreases significantly. For the single home layout, the number of
notifications decreases by 59% in 5 days. For double bedroom and
duplex layout, the number of notifications also decreases by 52.45%
and 74.67%, respectively. This indicates that users only have to deal
with higher feedback requests for a short period of time. Note that
Aegis pushes a notification for both FP and TN events as our test
dataset includes both normal user activity and malicious events.
Hence, the number of notifications generated for only FP events is
lower than it seems in Figure 7c. For example, in day 10, the total
number of notification is 10 among which 6 notifications are from
FP. Figure 7d shows how user feedback affects the accuracy of Aegis
in detecting different threats. One can notice that the accuracy of
Aegis increases very little from 50% to 100% user feedback. This
indicates that if the users actively train Aegis in the initial period
(1-5 days) in adaptive training mode, the performance improves
significantly. Again, Aegis always provides the option to choose a
specific time for adaptive training mode to the users. In conclusion,
Aegis can negate the consequence of user fatigue by terminating
adaptive training mode after an initial period, which is configurable
by the users.
5.5 Performance Overhead
We illustrate the performance overhead of Aegis, including resource
overhead and latency. We identify two major features that could
introduce a time delay in real-time operation.
Delay in adaptive training model: Aegis offers adaptive training
mode where any malicious event detected by Aegis is forwarded to
the user for validation. Aegis uses this validated data to retrain the
analytical model which introduces a time delay in the operation. In
Figure 7e, we illustrate the time needed for retraining the framework
with respect to the number of devices installed in the device. One
can notice that Aegis takes approximately 230 ms to train when
the system has 6 different installed in the SHS. The training time
increases to 519ms for 24 installed devices in the SHS. In short,Aegis
introduces negligible overhead in terms of time delay in adaptive
training mode.
Delay in action management module: Action management module
of Aegis alerts users in the event of malicious activity in SHS. The
alert message is sent to the controller device (smartphone, tablet,
etc.) in the form of notification which introduces a time delay in
the action management module. We use a SmartThings app to send
notifications to controller devices of authorized users. This app
communicates with the cloud server via http protocol which is
connected with the action management module (Section 4.4). On
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average, action management takes 210 ms time to send a notifica-
tion to the controller device from the moment of malicious activity
detection which is low for real-world deployment. In short, we
conclude that Aegis meets the efficient demands in the action man-
agement module. Appendix E provides details of the alert system
of Aegis in normal and adaptive training mode.
6 USER SCENARIOS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we illustrate how deploying Aegis in a smart home
can help different groups of consumers using several use scenarios
and discuss different benefits of Aegis.
6.1 User Scenarios
We illustrate three different user scenarios to understand the bene-
fits of Aegis among vendors, end-users, and developers.
Vendors- Smart home vendors can use Aegis to detect an abnormal
behavior in a customer’s home. Here, a customer, Alice, installs
several smart security devices (smart lock, smart camera, smart
fire alarm, etc.) and the corresponding smart apps to control them.
However, one of the installed app has malicious code that injects
false data when no one is at home to trigger the fire alarm (Table 1-
Threat- 2). As Alice does not have any idea of this malicious event,
she calls the security service provider/vendor for support. In this
situation, the security service provider can identify that the alarm
is generated from a false data from the state model generated by
Aegis and support the customer with appropriate suggestions such
as deleting the malicious app, reinstalling the correct app, etc.
End-users- End-users constitute the most common victims of ma-
licious events in a smart home. Attackers can perform several mali-
cious activities including gaining physical access to the home. For
instance, a smart home user, Bob, installs a new smart lock and the
corresponding app in the SHS. However, the installed app has a
malicious snippet to forward the unlock code to the attacker so he
can unlock the smart lock by impersonating Bob (Table 1- Threat 2).
Aegis can identify this event and notify the user in real-time. More-
over, Bob can change the state of the lock to unlock and prevent
any physical access of the smart home.
Developers- Developers or tech enthusiastic users can deploy
Aegis in their SHS and specify different rules to enhance the se-
curity of the their homes. For instance, Kyle, a smart home user,
installs multiple smart lights and motion sensors in his SHS. Kyle
also builds a new smart app to control the lights with motion. By
using the logic extractor of Aegis, Kyle can understand whether
his app logic is correct or not. Moreover, Kyle can use the adap-
tive training mode to see how the overall state of the SHS changes
with new devices and apps. If the action of the new smart lights
contradicts the existing system, or any malicious event occurs (e.g.,
Table 1- Threat 3), Kyle can understand the cause of the event and
take necessary steps. Moreover, Kyle can understand the working
conditions of smart home devices and improve his technological
knowledge using Aegis.
6.2 Discussion
Deployability in Real-life System- One of the prime features of
Aegis is easy deployability in real-life systems. Aegis uses a simple
smart app to collect device states in a SHS and build the context-
aware model. The detection mechanism runs in the cloud which
does not hamper the normal operation of the SHS. Users can install
Aegis similarly to any other smart app.
Applicability and Real-life Threats- Security risks may arise
from smart home apps performing side-channel attacks. For in-
stance, a smart app can flash the light in a specific pattern to leak
information or trigger another connected device which can be con-
sidered as a threat. While most of the existing solutions consider
this threat as out of scope [6, 22], Aegis successfully detects such
malicious behaviors. In addition, Aegis can detect device malfunc-
tions inside a SHS. For instance, if a smart light is configured with
the motion sensor, one should expect that the light turns on due to
the active motion. Other outcomes from this specific context may
be categorized by Aegis as a malfunction.
Multi-user activity in SHS- In SHS, more than one user may
perform different activities simultaneously. As Aegis utilizes user
activity contexts to detect malicious actions, correctly distinguish-
ing between different user activities is key. Instead of single-context
analysis, Aegis uses a pattern of contexts to understand the user ac-
tivities. Hence, Aegis can detect simultaneous activities performed
by different users and devices in a SHS. For instance, if two users
are walking towards the same point from opposite directions, Aegis
observes the related contexts to identify two different motion activ-
ities.
Time interval in device states- Smart home devices use sensors
to automate tasks. For instance, a smart light can be triggered by a
motion sensor or a door sensor. Each trigger-action scenario has
an effect time (time duration of a device being active). This effect
time has to be correctly considered to build the context of the user
activity. Aegis mitigates this time dependency by considering the
pattern of device utilization. For instance, the user sets a smart light
to remain on for two minutes if a motion is detected. This case
is detected by Aegis by checking consecutive states of the overall
smart home and is used to detect malicious apps or malfunctioning
devices (if the motion is sensed by the sensor and it holds the state
for 20s, the smart light should be also on for, at least, 20s otherwise
broken or malicious). Aegis uses these trigger-action scenarios to
mitigate the effect of the time interval and builds the contextual
model from device state patterns.
Detecting rare events- In a smart home, different autonomous
events occur based on device configuration and user activities.
These events may include rare events such as triggering fire alarms.
As Aegis uses daily user activities to train its analytical model,
these rare events might be unaddressed and flagged as threat. To
solve this, we use the app context to verify unrecognized events in
Aegis. Any alert triggered in Aegis is verified with the app context
generated from the installed app (Section 4.2). If the app context is
matchedwith the rare event,Aegis considers the event as benign and
retrain themodel automatically. Users can also check and verify rare
natural events through action management module (Appendix E).
7 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss threats to Smart Home Systems (SHSs)
and the shortcomings of existing security solutions available for
SHSs platforms.
Security Vulnerabilities: Recent works have outlined security
threats to SHSs [10, 23, 25].These threats focus on three SHSs com-
ponents: communication protocols, devices, and apps. Attackers
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may exploit implementation flaws in communication protocols to
leak sensitive information from devices [13, 21, 26] via information
extracted from network packets [1, 5, 16]. Fernandes et al. reported
several design flaws in SHSs [11]. Chi et al. showed that it is possible
to exploit smart home platform by triggering malicious activities
from legitimate user action [8]. As smart home devices can be con-
trolled by an accompanying smartphone app, the smartphone itself
can also be used to implement attacks [11, 30]. Jia et al. reported
the existence of several malicious apps that can be migrated from
smartphone and IoT platforms to SHSs [18]. Recently, IoTBench
repository [6, 17] revealed 19 different malicious apps for SHSs.
Existing Security Solutions: Researchers have introduced solu-
tions to secure SHSs against existing vulnerabilities.
Permission-based approach. Previous studies proposed permission-
based approaches to provide security in SHSs. Jia et al. introduced
ContextIoT, a context-aware permission model to restrict unautho-
rized device access and detect malicious activities in SHSs [18].
Policy and configuration analysis. Several policy-based security mea-
sures were proposed to limit unauthorized access to SHSs [7, 31, 35].
Similar to permission-based approaches, these solutions depend
on user decision. Mohsin et al. presented IoTSAT, a framework to
analyze threats on SHSs using device configurations and enforced
user policies [22].
Static analysis. Recently, static analysis of smart home apps have
been proposed to detect information leakage and cross-app inter-
ference. Berkay and Babun et al. introduced a static analysis tool,
SaINT, to track sensitive information in smart home apps [6]. Chi
et al. proposed a static analysis tool to extract app context from
smart home apps to detect cross-app interference [8].
Forensic analysis. Forensic analysis of smart home data has been
proposed to identifymalicious events in a SHS.Wang et al. proposed
a security tool, ProvThings, which logs run-time data from smart
home apps and perform provenance tracking to detect malicious
activities in a SHS [36]. Babun et al. proposed IoTDots, a forensic
analysis tools which can detect user behavior from logged data in
a SHS [4].
Differences from the existing solutions: The differences between
Aegis and existing solutions (although they are useful) can be ar-
ticulated as follows. (1) While existing solutions focus on securing
shared data and improving current user permission system [18],
Aegis detects malicious behaviors by considering user and device
activity contexts in a SHS. (2) Aegis considers both smart home
configurations and installed apps to build a context-aware model
and detect threats at run-time which outdo user-dependent so-
lutions [18]. (3) Additionally, no source code modification [4] is
needed for Aegis to collect data from smart home devices and detect
malicious activities in a SHS. (4) Unlike threat-specific existing solu-
tions [6, 36], Aegis can detect five different types of threat in a SHS
which makes it a more robust solution. (5) Finally, Aegis collects
data from a common access point and performs behavior analysis
at run-time which reduces cost in terms of processing and over-
head from other prior works [4, 6]. In addition, Aegis does not store
user data from smart home devices which reduces the privacy risks
and concerns from prior solutions [4]. In summary, Aegis offers a
context-aware security framework which uses behavior analysis,
usage patterns, and app context to detect malicious activities at
run-time and ensures security against five different threats to SHS
with high accuracy and minimal overhead.
8 CONCLUSION
New app-based smart home systems (SHSs) expose the smart home
ecosystem to novel threats. Attackers can perform different attacks
or deceive users into installing malicious apps. In this paper, we
presented Aegis, a novel context-aware security framework for
smart homes that detects malicious activities by (1) observing the
change in device behavior based on user activities and (2) building a
contextual model to differentiate benign andmalicious behavior.We
evaluated Aegis in multiple smart home settings, with real-life users,
with real SHS devices (i.e., Samsung SmartThings platform), and
with different day-to-day activities. Our detailed evaluation shows
that Aegis can achieve over 95% of accuracy and F-score in different
smart home settings. We also tested Aegis against several malicious
behaviors. Aegis is highly effective in detecting threats to smart
home systems regardless of the smart home layouts, the number of
users, and enforced user policies. Finally, Aegis can detect different
malicious behavior and threats in SHS with minimum overhead. As
future work, we will expand our framework by considering new
multi-user settings and policies into the analysis.
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A PERFORMANCE METRICS
In the evaluation of Aegis, we used six different performance met-
rics: True Positive rate (TP), False Negative rate (FN), True Negative
rate (TN), False Positive rate (FP), Accuracy, and F-score. TP rate in-
dicates the percentage of correctly identified benign activities while
TN rate refers to the percentage of correctly identified malicious
activities. On the other hand, FP and FN illustrates the number of
malicious activities identified as benign and the number of benign
activities detected as malicious activities respectively. F-score is a
indicator of accuracy of a framework which considers TP and TN
as computational vector. The performance metrics are defined by
the following equations:
T P rate =
T P
T P + FN
, (4)
FN rate =
FN
T P + FN
, (5)
T N rate =
T N
TN + F P
, (6)
F P rate =
F P
T N + F P
, (7)
Accuracy =
T P +T N
T P +T N + F P + FN
, (8)
F − score = 2 ∗T P ∗T N
T P +T N
. (9)
B SAMPLE SMART APP FOR APP CONTEXT
One of the features of Aegis is using app context to verify the device
states in the SHS. To build the app context, we used similar static
analysis approaches used in prior works [6, 8]. We performed a
source-to-sink taint analysis similar to [6] to extract the app context.
Additionally, we consider the sources for smart apps proposed
in [8, 18]. We then built the abstract syntax tree (AST) and model a
trigger-action scenario of an app. We tracked the Subscribe method
to represent the trigger and follow the conditional statement (e.g.,
if and switch) to reach the sink. This flow from entry point (source)
to a sink is used to construct the condition of an app which is then
represented into app context. We collected 150 official Samsung
SmartThings apps (available in their website) and created the app
context database using this method.
Listing 3: A code snippet of a sample smart app
1 /∗ This is a sample smart light app for Samsung SmartThings ∗/
2 definition(
3 name: "Smart Light App",
4 namespace: "smartthings",
5 author: "anonymous",
6 description: "Turn lights on when door is open.",
7 category: "Convenience",
8 )
9 preferences {
10 section("When the door opens/closes...") {
11 input "contact1", "capability.contactSensor", title: "Where?"
12 }
13 section("Turn on/off a light...") {
14 input "light1", "capability.light"
15 }
16 }
17 def installed() {
18 subscribe(contact1, "contact", contactHandler)
19 }
20 def updated() {
21 unsubscribe()
22 subscribe(contact1, "contact", contactHandler)
23 }
24 def contactHandler(event) {
25 if (event.value == "open") {
26 light1.on()
27 } else if (event.value == "closed") {
28 light1.off()
29 }
30 }
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Listing 4: trigger-action Scenario of a sample app
1 Trigger: Contact1
2 Action: Switch1
3 Logic 1: contact1 = on, light1 = on
4 Logic 2: contact1 = off, light1 = off
Listing 5: Generated app context of a sample app
1 App Context 1: contact1 = 1 , Light1 = 1
2 App context 2: contact1 = 0, Light1 = 0
C LIST OF SMART HOME DEVICES USED IN
AEGIS
Device
Type Model
Description
Smart Home Hub Samsung SamrtThings Hub
• Works as a central access point for
smart home entities.
• Supports Wi-Fi, ZigBee,and Z-Wave.
Smart Light Philips Hue Light Bulb
• Uses a separate communication bridge
to connect with smart home hub.
• Uses ZigBee to communicate with other
components in SHS.
• Supports up to 12 different sensors.
Smart Lock
Yale B1L Lock with
Z-Wave Push Button
Deadbolt
• Uses Z-Wave to connect with other
devices.
• Offers different pin code for different
users.
• Provides both manual and remote
access.
Fire Alarm
First Alert 2-in-1 Z-Wave
Smoke Detector and
Carbon Monoxide Alarm
• Uses Z-Wave to connect with the hub
• Provides built-in smoke and CO sensors.
Smart
Monitoring
System
Arlo by NETGEAR
Security System
• Uses Wi-Fi to connect with smart home
hub.
• Offers both live monitoring and still
pictures.
Smart
Thermostat Ecobee 4 Smart Thermostat
• Uses Wi-Fi to communicate with smart
hub.
• Can be configured with sensors.
Smart TV
Samsung 6 Series
UN49MU6290F LED
Smart TV
• Connects with smart home hub using
Wi-Fi.
Motion, Light,
& temperature
sensor
Fibaro FGMS-001 Motion Sensor
• Uses Z-Wave to connect with the hub.
• Can be configured with different
devices simultaneously.
Door Sensor Samsung Multipurpose Sensor • Uses ZigBee protocol to connect withsmart home hub.
Table 4: List of devices used in the data collection.
D DETAILED THREAT MODEL USED DURING
AEGIS EVALUATION
To evaluate Aegis, we considered five different threat models (Sec-
tion 3). We built five malicious apps to represent these threats. Our
malicious apps cover several known threats presented by other
researchers in [18, 38]. To perform the attack described in Threat 1,
we built a battery monitor App for smart locks that leaks the unlock
code via SMS to the attacker. We realized the impersonation attack
by unlocking the smart lock as an outsider using the leaked unlock
code. For Threat 2, we built an app that injects false smoke sensor
data to trigger the fire alarm in the SHS. For Threat 3, we created an
app that flickered a smart light in a specific pattern while nobody
was in the home. To perform the denial-of-service attack described
in Threat 4, we developed an app that stopped the smart thermostat
for a pre-defined value. For Threat 5, we created an app that could
generate morse code using a smart light while no person was in
the room and triggered a smart camera to take stealthy pictures.
Our malicious apps cover several existing attacks on smart home
devices presented by the researchers [18, 38]. In Table 5, we mapped
our threat models with existing malicious apps presented by the
researchers. Our threat model covers the malicious apps presented
in the prior works and Aegis can detect these threats with high
accuracy.
Aegis Threat Model ContextIoT [18] IoTBench [38]
Threat-1 • Backdoor pin code injection.
• Lock access revocation.
• LockManager.
• App Update – PowersOutAlert.
• Lock access revocation.
• Permissions- Implicit 2
Threat-2 • Fake alarm.
• Remote control – FireAlarm.
• Remote command – SmokeDe-
tector.
—
Threat-3 • Leaking information.
• creating seizures using strobed
light.
• IPC – MaliciousCameraIPC &
PresenceSensor.
• MidnightCamera.
• Side Channel - Side Channel 1.
• Side Channel - Side Channel 1.
Threat-4 • Disabling vacation mode.
• Abusing permission.
—
Threat-5 • Surreptitious surveillance.
• Undesired unlocking.
• IPC – MaliciousCameraIPC &
PresenceSensor.
—
Table 5: Malicious Apps mapping of Aegis, ContextIoT, and
IoTBench
E ALERT SYSTEM IN AEGIS
Aegis proposes an adaptive training mode to improve the accuracy
of the framework and detect the false positive and negative oc-
currences. In Figure 8, both adaptive training mode and normal
operation mode are illustrated.
(a) Normal Mode (b) Adaptive Training Mode
Figure 8: User interface of Aegis in different operationmode.
F EXAMPLE OF SHS LAYOUT USED DURING
EVALUATION
To collect data for Aegis, we setup three different SHS layouts where
users replicated their daily activities in a smart home. In Figure 9,
the single bedroom layout of a smart home is shown which is used
to take the user data in our emulator. Users clicked on different
places in the layout while listing their daily activities in a timely
manner. These activities were used to train and test the efficacy of
Aegis.
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Figure 9: Single bedroom smart home layout used during evaluation.
